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COMMENTS

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON
STATE SEVERANCE TAXES

It seems to me that we are approaching three alternatives: One is the
second conquest of the West by the power of the East. Another is
the marshalling of forces by the West to become the OPEC of the
North American Continent .... The third alternative is the develop-

ment of a sane, rational policy of national scope which is fair to us
all.
-Former Texas Governor John B. Connally
As the nation's energy crisis deepens, so too do the smoldering
divisions between the energy-producing states of the West and the
more populous energy-consuming states. One indicator of that division is a bill before Congress that seeks to impose a federal ceiling on
unreasonable and excessive state severance taxes on coal.' While not
commanding majority support at this time, the proposed legislation
is nevertheless expressive of a growing resistance to the taxes levied
by most western states on the extraction of natural resources. 2 That
resistance was aptly demonstrated during the recent congressional
debates on the Windfall Profits Tax. 3 A proposed amendment to the
bill would not only have restricted state severance taxes, but also
would have extended the federal windfall tax to oil and gas wells
owned and operated by state governments. The measure's sponsor,
Senator John Danforth of Missouri, argued that the provision was
necessary because energy producing states, like the oil industry, are
enjoying an enormous revenue windfall from rapidly escalating prices.
He predicted that these suddenly richer states will soon be able to
conduct "the most effective economic warfare against the rest of the
country ever dreamed of."4
Similar arguments are now before the Montana Supreme Court,
where various utility and mining companies are challenging the Montana coal severance tax.' Set at approximately 30 percent of value, it
1. H.R. 5294, 96th Cong., 1st sess. (1979).
2. Note, The Increasing Conflict Between State Coal Severance Taxation and Federal
Energy Policy, 57 TEX. L. REV. 675 (1979) [hereinafter cited asIncreasingConflict].
3. Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229 (to be
codified in scattered sections of 7, 19, 26, 31, 42 U.S.C.).
4. 125 CONG. REC. S 18,056 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 1979).
5. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, No. 42657 (tst Jud. Dist. July 27, 1979).
The court's dismissal of the case, for failure to state a claim, is currently on appeal to the
Montana Supreme Court.
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is the highest severance tax in the nation. The companies contend that
if inflation and other factors are considered, the amount of tax payable on existing long-term contracts will amount to billions of dollars
-a cost that ultimately will be passed on to consumers in the Midwest.6 The firms argue that the tax raises the cost of coal far beyond
the social cost of production and, in reality, effects a transfer of
wealth from coal consumers to the state of Montana.
It is readily apparent that the question of resource taxation involves two of the most fundamental policy problems engendered by
the energy crisis. Although at times haphazard and inefficient, the
development, production and utilization of energy has always been
regulated concurrently at the state and federal levels. The question
now is whether this allocation of regulatory power should continue,
or whether the responsibility should be consolidated at the federal
level. A related and perhaps more immediate problem involves the
division of benefits associated with higher energy prices.
Traditionally, extraction tax rates have always been considered
nominal in relation to the value of the minerals extracted. Today,
however, with energy prices increasing sharply, legislators in many
states have moved to improve severance tax structures. As a result
both the incidence and rate of taxation have risen rapidly. 7 This development poses significant new issues that bear sharply on the tenuous balance between state and federal power. Just as the Great Depression of the 1930s transformed the federal government into a
powerful instrument for controlling the national economy, the
energy crisis may similarly herald another historic shift in governmental powers. As severance taxes rise, they become subject to challenge as an impermissible burden on interstate commerce, as well as
an attempt by energy-producing states to enhance their economies at
the expense of the rest of the nation. To the extent that any exercise
of state conservation, taxing or police power frustrates federal energy
goals or endangers national security interests, there will be demands
for federal preemption of the energy field.'
The problem confronting western states is how to exercise their
sovereign powers in a responsible manner that will survive both legal
challenge and political attack. Clearly, legitimate and even compelling public policies can justify mineral taxation. The ghost towns of
the West are a vivid reminder of the disruptions that accompanied
6. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 5, Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, No. 42657 (1st Jud. Dist. July 27, 1979) [hereinafter
cited as Plaintiff's Memorandum].
7. See Whiteside & Gillig, Coal and Conservation-TaxPolicy, 64 KY. L.J. 573 (1976).
8. See Increasing Conflict, supra note 2.
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earlier booms. The settlement of the West, often dictated by national
needs, has always occurred by leaps and bounds, by waves and impulses, and few western cities have not experienced their boom days. 9
For this reason, western states refuse to accept energy development
solely as a necessity of national policy. To the extent that they are
expected to fuel the rest of the nation, these states seek in return the
development of high quality, economically diverse and viable communities that will prosper long after the mineral wealth is gone. Resource taxation is essential to this goal. This comment traces the development of modern legal principles applicable to commerce and
supremacy clause attacks on state severance taxes. It also discusses
the ingredients of an adequate defense, particularly the public purposes that must underlie state resource taxes.
COMMERCE CLAUSE LIMITATIONS
At the heart of the controversy over resource taxation is the meaning of the commerce clause of the United States Constitution. Article
I, Section 8 includes among the powers of Congress, the authority
"to regulate Commerce among the Several States. . . ." These few
words comprise the great jurisdictional dividing line in our federal
system. Implicit in the positive federal power to regulate national
commerce is the negative implication that states do not have the
same power. The early case of Gibbons v. Ogden' 0 initiated a long
controversy over the extent to which the commerce clause restricted
state power and whether it was an exclusive or a concurrent power.
The debate arises in part from the tension inherent in a federal system. 1
Those who are committed to state sovereignty view the commerce
clause as the product of a political compromise, an essentially negative restraint that merely defines the balance of power between the
9. R. HILL, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AND DEMOCRACY 64 (1968).
Western states have ever sought to protect their own interests and have resented interference; western communities and sections have fought valiantly
for local control; and individuals have.., sought to rid themselves of or avoid
restraint. Economically and socially we have found explanations for this in the
general conditions which have obtained in the West coincident with its occupation.
Id. at 128.
10. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
11. See generally F. FRANKFURTER, THE COMMON CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL,
TANEY, AND WHITE (1964); F. RIBBLE, STATE AND NATURAL POWER OVER COMMERCE (1937); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978); Sholley, The
Negative Implications of the Commerce Clause, 3 U. CHI. L. REV. 556 (1936); Stern, The
Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946 (pt. 1), 59 HARV. L. REV. 645
(1946).
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state and federal governments. Accordingly, they assert that the commerce clause prohibits only the most destructive exercises of state
power: trade barrierism and economic discrimination or retaliation.
Therefore, states have the power to levy reasonable severance taxes,
despite their incidental effect on commerce. The countervailing view,
as frequently expressed by Justice Frankfurter, is that the commerce
clause is a free trade charter for national commerce, the hallmark of
an economic order that seeks an optimum allocation of resources.' 2
To the extent that any state tax or regulation makes interstate commerce more expensive, it must be declared unconstitutional. Proponents of this view argue that natural resources are national commodities in a free market and they recognize no right in states to levy
resource taxes:
Like a tollgate lying athwart a trading route, a severance or processing tax conditions access to natural resources .... The state's re-

sources are diminished not by severance of a mineral, for the extractive process adds to its value, but by exportation-and the commerce
3
clause clearly prohibits the imposition of a tax on exportation.'
But just as the ratio of federal-state power is not abstractly delineated, neither are the contours of the commerce clause fixed and
static. The Constitution has been viewed as flexible and enduring, responsive to "the various crises of human affairs."' ' Likewise the
scope of the commerce clause has been adapted to meet changing
social and economic needs. It has been aptly stated that the history
of commerce clause adjudication is best understood "as the search
for that balance of federal-state power best serving the needs of society at any particular time, with the recognition that societal problems are continually changing and growing increasingly complex."' s
"Old" versus "Modern" tests
The state of Montana is defending its coal severance tax on the
premise that mining is a distinctly "local" activity not subject to
commerce clause regulation. The argument relies heavily on a series
of significant resource cases decided in the 1920s, a time when the
United States Supreme Court nurtured a laissez-faire concept of nar12. See Brown, The Open Economy: Justice Frankfurterand the Position of the Judiciary, 67 YALE L. J. 219 (1957).

13. Note, Federal Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate Business, 75 HARV. L.
REV. 953, 970-71 (1962) (hereinafter cited as FederalLimitations].
14. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
15. C. DUMARS & L. BROWN, LEGAL ISSUES IN STATE TAXATION OF ENERGY
DEVELOPMENT 7 (1979).
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rowly limited federal powers. The cases, known as the Heisler trilogy,
1
each involved commerce clause challenges to state resource taxes. 6
In Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., as in the present Montana case, the
tax was levied on mined coal, most of which was shipped out of state.
It was argued that the tax was largely a tribute upon the consumption of other states. But in each of the cases the Court found that
mining and mineral production, "like manufacturing,"' ' is a local
activity that precedes commerce and is not subject to commerce
clause limitations.
The Heisler decisions were consonant with the prevailing notion
that interstate and intrastate commerce were entirely separate and
distinct. In those days the Court delineated the scope of the commerce clause by applying a rigid, mechanical test. If goods -were
found to be moving in interstate commerce, actually in transit from
one state to another, they were within the ambit of federal jurisdiction and immune from state taxation and regulation. Correspondingly, if goods had not yet entered the stream of commerce or had
ended their interstate journey, they were beyond the scope of federal
taxation or regulation. Underlying this approach was a concern that
the federal system would be endangered unless the Court drew sharp
distinctions between mutually exclusive areas of state and federal
control. The Court in Heisler feared that to extend the commerce
power to local business activities would be to nationalize all industries:
[I] t would nationalize and withdraw from state jurisdiction and deliver to federal commercial control the fruits of California and the
South, the wheat of the West and its meats, the cotton of the South,
the shoes of Massachusetts and the woolen industries of other States,
at the very inception of their production or growth ... because they
are in varying percentages destined for and surely to be exported to
States other than those of their production.' 8
It is the Heisler distinction between local business and the flow of
commerce that continues to this day to shield state resource taxes
from successful commerce clause challenge.' 9 But while the Heisler
16. Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S. (1927); Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262
U.S. 172 (1923); Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245 (1922).
17. Oliver Iron Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172, 178 (1923).
18. Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245, 259-60 (1922).
19. This analysis continues to be applied by modern state courts confronted with the
severance tax/commerce clause issue. See Industrial Uranium Co. v. State Tax Commission,
95 Az. 130, 387 P.2d 1013 (1963); California Co. v. Colorado, 141 Colo. 288, 348 P.2d 382
(1959); Bel Oil Corp. v. Roland, 242 La. 498, 137 So.2d 308 (1962); Virginia Electric &
Power Co. v. Haden, 200 S.E.2d 848 (W. Va. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974).
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cases have not been expressly overruled, a half-century of momentous commerce clause adjudication has seriously eroded their continuing validity. The intervening years have witnessed a remarkable extension of federal regulatory powers, which reach in varying degrees
to each of the items enumerated in Heisler as reserved in the exclusive control of the states. Notably, Congress has used its commerce
power to regulate coal as it lies in the ground and the many activities
integral to coal mining.2
In addition, the production of other
natural resources, such as agricultural produce, has been successfully
regulated by Congress. 2'
It was the Great Depression, and the realization that the states
alone were unable to deal with a crippling nation-wide crisis, that saw
the commerce clause transformed into perhaps the single most important tool for centralizing the national economy and achieving
social reform. The consequent shift in power from the states to the
federal government has impressed some as being almost revolutionary.' 2 Today the commerce clause is said to be an affirmative power
commensurate with national needs.2 I It is applicable whenever Congress finds that the regulated activity has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, even if the activity is wholly within a state and even
if the particular
activity standing alone would have but a trivial eco2
nomic effect. 4
Indeed, the Heisler Court scarcely could have foreseen that the
commerce power would soon be extended to reach and prohibit the
production of wheat by farmers for their own home consumption. In
Wickard v. Filburn,2 the Court rejected a farmer's contention that
management of his 23 acre wheat field was a purely local activity,
having at most an indirect effect on commerce. Not only did the
Court reject the farmer's position as an unwarranted reliance upon
mechanical applications of the law, but it also repudiated the underlying rationale with an historical survey of the commerce power and
its expansion after Congress began to use it in an affirmative manner.
20. The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. § § 801-962 (1976 &
Supp. 111978).
21. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 137 (1970); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator of Wage & Hour Div., 312 U.S. 126,amended 312 U.S. 657 (1941).
22. H. ROTTSCHAEFER, THE CONSTITUTION AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGE
95 (1948).
23. American Power & Light Company v. S.E.C., 329 U.S. 90, 103 (1946).
24. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971). Moreover, the scope of the commerce power is limited only by other express Constitutional prohibitions and the restraints
implicit in the nature of a federal system.
25. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).

October 19801

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS

The Court specifically referred to the Heisler cases as earlier pronouncements that are no longer the law.' 6
In Parker v. Brown, 2 the Court again refused to apply the Heisler
test, and, equally as important, the Court emphasized that the commerce clause is a limitation on state power even without the affirmative action of Congress. While noting that California's regulation of
raisin marketing would pass muster under a mechanical test, the
Court continued:
But courts are not confined to so mechanical a test. When Congress
has not exerted its power under the Commerce Clause, and state regulation of matters of local concern is so related to interstate commerce that it also operates as a regulation of that commerce, the
reconciliation of the power thus granted with that reserved to the
state is to be attained by the accomodation of the competing demands of the state and national interests involved. 2 8
The Parker case enunciated the rudiment of a balancing test that
would be more precisely refined and applied increasingly in successive cases. It also signaled that, just as Congress was acting affirmatively under the commerce clause, the Court too would be more
assertive in enforcing the negative limitations of the clause: invalidating state legislation that unduly restricted the national commerce.
Subsequently, in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,2 9 the Court struck
down an Arizona law limiting the length of trains passing through the
state. The decision states firmly that, absent congressional action, the
Court, "and not the state legislature, is under the commerce clause
the final arbitrator of the competing demands of state and national
interests."' 0
Nonetheless, the Court proceeded cautiously, unwilling at times to
extend the negative scope of the commerce clause as broadly as it
had recognized the clause's affirmative reach. As a result, a so-called
"two-tiered" definition of the commerce clause developed, in which
commerce was defined more narrowly when Congress had not acted
than when it had acted. The distinction was recognized by the Court
in Minnesota v. Blasius,3 Wickard v. Filburn,3 2 United States v.
Darby," 3 and most recently in Douglas v. Seacoast Products where
26. Id. at 122-23.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

317 U.S. 341 (1943).
Id. at 362.
325 U.S. 761 (1945).
Id. at 769.
290 U.S. 1 (1933).
317 U.S. 111 (1942).
312 U.S. 100 (1941).

894
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the Court said that its language in upholding the rights of states to
tax interstate commerce cannot be "used interchangeably as statements of law where the issue is the power of Congress to regulate
under the Commerce Clause."" On the basis of these cases, the state
of Montana is arguing that cases dealing with Congress' plenary commerce power cannot be cited as authority for limiting the power of
states to levy resource taxes. However, this argument is now open to
question in light of two more recent Supreme Court decisions.
In City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey,"S the Court struck down a
state statute prohibiting the interstate transportation of waste destined for New Jersey landfills. The Court not only found garbage to
be an item of interstate commerce, but it also indicated that the New
Jersey Supreme Court, in upholding the statute, had erroneously
relied on a two-tiered definition of commerce. The Court noted that
many subjects of potential federal regulation inevitably escape congressional attention and may be regulated by the states "so long as
they act within the restraints imposed by the Commerce Clause itself." 3 6 A year later, in an important footnote in Hughes v. Oklahoma, '7 the Court read City of Philadelphia as rejecting the twotiered definition of cominerce. The Hughes Court stated without
equivocation that "the definition of 'commerce' is the same when
relied on to strike down or restrict state legislation as when
relied on
'
to support some exertion of federal control or regulation." 8
It is clear that if the dicta of Hughes becomes law, the severanceprecedes-commerce test of Heisler will at last give way to the modern
invalidating factor, substantially-affecting-commerce, thereby gutting
the applicability of the early severance tax cases to future commerce
clause challenges.3 9 In any event, this is only one of the undercurrents working to erode the Heisler Doctrine and indicating that
states should be prepared for a determination that severance taxation
can be reached by the commerce clause. Since 1939, the Supreme
Court has consistently rejected mechanical commerce clause tests in
favor of a more flexible and policy-orientated balancing approach.
The complexity of modern society, in which an interference at one
point in the system can directly affect what happens in another area,
underscores the simplistic approach of the old tests; with their formal
distinctions and rigid application, they operated more as a legal con'

34. 431 U.S. 265, 282 n.17 (1977).
35. 437 U.S. 617 (1978), rev'g Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n v. Municipal
Sanitary Landfill Auth., 68 N.J. 451, 348 A.2d 505 (1975).
36. Id. at 623.
37. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
38. Id. at 326 n.2.
39. C. DUMARS & L. BROWN, supra note 15, at 34.
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clusion than a factual determination. By contrast, the balancing approach requires an inquiry into the actual effects of the regulation
and a careful appraisal and accommodation of the competing demands of the state and national interests in each case." 0 The Court
must balance the conflicting interests, an evaluative process in which
the Court's discretion can be the decisive factor in either protecting
state powers or expanding the area of effective federal control. Recent cases have significantly refined the balancing approach in the
areas of both state taxation and regulation. The states must be prepared to deal with these cases.
State Regulation
The modern balancing test is most clearly articulated in Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc.4 1 in which the Court struck down a state statute
requiring that Arizona cantaloupes be packaged in-state before shipment in interstate commerce. The decision sets forth a four-pronged
test:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposedon such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.
(T)he extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course
depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether
...

be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activiit could
4
ties. 2

a. Legitimate State Interest
The weight accorded to a state interest depends upon the Court's
appraisal of both the necessity and nature of the objective sought. It
had long been a general rule that health and safety interests, as traditional objects of State police power authority, were afforded the
greatest deference against commerce clause attack. Conversely, at the
other end of the regulatory scale, economically based regulations
aimed at enhancing the local economy were always suspect and frequently invalidated. In recent cases, however, the Court has been
more careful to scrutinize all state regulations and less willing to
accept, without question, state health and safety laws. For instance,
in Raymond Motor Transportation,Inc. v. Rice," 3 the Court invali40. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945).

41. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
42. Id. at 142.
43. 434 U.S. 429 (1978). See also Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520

1959).
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dated a state motor vehicle restriction, finding that the state had not
overcome extensive evidence that the law did not in fact contribute
to highway safety.
At the same time, courts have been willing to recognize a much
broader range of legitimate subjects for state regulation, including
regulations designed to provide local economic benefit. The Court
has upheld state regulations to stabilize a produce industry, 4 4 ensure
a steady supply of milk, create jobs, preserve a state's financial resources, or otherwise protect its residents' pocketbooks.4 Courts
have also accorded substantial deference to state environmental policies, upholding the nondiscriminatory conservation of natural resources, 4 6 the maintenance of the state's environmental quality,4
and regulations aimed at water pollution control, solid waste problems and wildlife preservation.4 8
The Court's willingness to expand the scope of state regulatory
power stems from a recognition that the social and economic forces
that produced an expansion of federal powers have required a concurrent growth in state functions. But while paving the way for a
more extensive assertion of state power, the courts are also making
clear that the exercise of that power will be subject to a much closer
scrutiny. The Pike test aims to ensure that a regulation's stated objectives are real and legitimate and the burdens to commerce no greater
than necessary.
b. Evenhandedness
The requirement of evenhandedness ensures that a state regulation
will not discriminate against interstate commerce. When a regulation
is challenged, this is often the critical inquiry. Even those statutes
that appear to be neutral are carefully examined for discriminatory
effects in their operation. 4 For instance, when the burden of the
challenged regulation falls disparately on out-of-state residents, as
does resource taxation, the Court assumes that the state legislature
has not been subject to proper political checks and a finding of dis44. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 368 (1943).
45. See generally Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
46. Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950).
47. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
48. Proctor & Gamble Co. v. City of Chicago, 509 F.2d 69 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 978 (1975); Soap & Detergent Ass'n v. Clark, 330 F. Supp. 1218 (S.D. Fla. 1971);
Palladio, Inc. v. Diamond, 321 F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1319 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 983 (1971); American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control
Comm'n, 517 P.2d 691 (Ore. App. 1973).
49. Arizona Public Service Co. v. Snead, 441 U.S. 141 (1979); City of Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co., 258 U.S. 50 (1922).
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crimination may follow.' 0 When the effect is clearly discriminatory,
the court requires a more rigorous judicial scrutiny and a greater burden for state justification.' 1 Without substantial justification, the
statute will fail. And where a state regulation is discriminatory on its
face, in the nature of a trade barrier the Court applies a virtual per se
rule of invalidity, reasoning that such measures invite retaliatory
measures and multiple state barriers, all in contravention of the cen-

tral purpose of the commerce clause.' 2
c. Balancing and a Less Intrusive Means
Even if a state regulation is not discriminatory, the Pike test requires a further inquiry. The court, having assessed the state interest,
must determine the extent to which the legislative means chosen are
reasonably related to the goal sought to be achieved. These factors
are then weighed against the national interest in a free economy to
decide if the burden upon commerce is excessive.
Generally, the Court has been reluctant to substitute its judgment
for that of the states in determining whether the objective could be
achieved through less drastic means. In fact, this less intrusive means
requirement has been applied only where state regulations have been
5
found to operate discriminatorily despite a legitimate state interest. 3
And in such cases, it is said that this prong of the test applies a rigid
bottom line to an otherwise flexible standard, where "even the most
compelling local purposes will not save the regulation unless there is
no 'reasonable non-discriminatory alternative available' that is 'adequate to conserve [the] legitimate local intent.' "' 4

The balancing of state and federal interests, a constant theme' ' in
commerce clause adjudication, is ultimately the decisive factor in the
Pike test. Balancing of interests necessarily forces courts to make
50. Hunt v. Washington apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); Dean Milk Co.
v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525
(1949); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
51. Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); Dean Milk
Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). See also Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327
U.S. 416, 431 (1946).
52. Polar lee Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361 (1964); Dean Milk Co. v.
City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). See also City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S.
617 (1978). Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976).
53. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977);
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). Most recently, in Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979), the Court restated this element of the Pike test in terms of discrimination: "Whether alternative means could promote this local purpose as well without
discriminating against interstate commerce." Id. at 336.
54. C. DUMARS & L. BROWN, supra note 15, at 19, quoting Dean Milk Co. v. City of
Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 854 (1951).
55. C. DUMARS & L. BROWN, supra note 15, at 16.
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decisions on important matters of policy, sensitive to the tides of
political opinion, and, here again, recent rulings indicate that the
Court is showing a more careful analysis of the question. In the past,
the Court sometimes spared the balancing test out of deference to
state health and safety interests. For instance, in Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen v. Chicago, Rhode Island & Pacific Railroad," 6
the Court remarked that "it is difficult at best to say that financial
losses should be balanced against the loss of lives and limbs of workers
and people using the highways." For a time after this decision the
lower courts refused to balance health and safety concerns against
economic loss. However, in the recent Raymond Motor case,' ' the
Supreme Court put a halt to this trend. The Court there made clear
that even where the state purpose is valid and proper deference is
given to legislative judgment, the Court must nevertheless weigh the
competing state and national interests to arrive at an attainable public policy balance.
In summary, the regulation cases require (1) that a proposed regulation be nondiscriminatory; (2) that it actually and demonstratively
further legitimate local interests, and (3) that the state be able to
show that any burdens on interstate commerce are outweighed by
the local objective at stake. In addition, if the regulation is discriminatory, the state must overcome the virtually impossible burden of
demonstrating that the legitimate state interest cannot be furthered
by any less drastic means. The failure to "adequately answer all these
concerns can leave the regulatory provision vulnerable to attack on
any single one."' 8
State Taxation
While the Supreme Court was continuously polishing its approach
to state regulations, its decisions in the related field of state taxation
were greeted frequently with dismay and frustration. Commentators
noted that the Court's attempts to delineate state taxing powers
often defied national analysis, adding that the Court itself recognized
that "consistency was not a hallmark of its pronouncements in this
field."' ' Recent decisions, however, have marked a surprising and
substantial change, a development so significant that it has been said,
"The subject of interstate commerce and state taxation is perhaps
the quiet revolution in current constitutional adjudication." '6
56.
57.
58.
59.
proach
60.

393 U.S. 129, 140 (1968).
Raymond Motor Transport, Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978).
C. DUMARS & L. BROWN, supra note 15, at 20.
Hellerstein, State Taxation and the Supreme Court: Toward a More Unified Apto Constitutional Adjudication?, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1426 (1977).
C. DUMARS & L. BROWN, supra note 15, at 20.
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What the Court has done is to abolish what had long been a fundamental tenet of commerce clause doctrine: the notion that the privilege of doing exclusively interstate business could not be subject to
state taxation. This principle evolved logically enough from an inference that the commerce clause precluded states from barring the
transaction of interstate commerce within their borders. 6 But as
much as the doctrine sought to protect interstate trade, it ignored
the legitimate revenue needs of the states; state taxes were invalidated even though they were not levied as a condition to doing business in the state and despite the fact that both foreign and domestic
businesses were taxed at an equal rate.
Over the years, the Court recognized various exceptions to the
doctrine. In keeping with the distinction between strictly inter- and
intrastate commerce, states were permitted to levy taxes on the
purely "local" incidents of an otherwise interstate business. 6 2 But
this approach seemed only to heighten the Court's tendency toward
making formal and mechanical distinctions; hence taxes frequently
were invalidated on no sounder reasoning than the local terminology
used to describe the tax.6 As early as 1929, Justice Stone criticized
the privilege doctrine, saying he could find no "practical justification
.. for an interpretation of the commerce clause which would relieve
those engaged in interstate commerce from their fair share of the expense of government of the states in which they operate by exempting them from the payment of a tax of general application, which is
neither aimed at nor discriminates against interstate commerce. "64
Nearly fifty years later a majority of the Court agreed.
In 1977, in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 6 s the Court upheld a Mississippi "privilege" tax, announcing that interstate business
must now pay a fair share of the state tax burden "even though it increases the cost of doing business. "66 The Court was careful to formulate a flexible test that would both free the states to levy taxes
and yet safeguard against discriminatory levies, trade barriers and
multiple or cumulative state tax burdens. A tax will be sustained if
61. Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1 (1877).
62. See, e.g., Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948); Coverdale v.
Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 303 U.S. 604 (1938). And, "[wIithout explicitly abandoning the privilege concept, the Court developed the multiple taxation doctrine that undermined the basis for... tax immunity ..
" Hellerstein, supra note 59, at 1443.
63. A tax on apportioned net income was upheld in Northwestern States Portland
Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959), while a similar tax, attached to the "privileges of doing business," was struck down in Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340
U.S. 602 (1951).
64. Helson v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245, 253 (1929) (Stone, J., concurring).
65. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
66. Id. at 288, quoting Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254
(1938).
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four conditions are met: the tax "is applied to an activity with a sub-

stantial nexus with the taxing state, is fairly apportioned, does not
discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the
services provided by the state.""I6

The Court expressly equated the

new standard to the balancing test in Pike, saying the Court had
"moved toward a standard of permissibility of state taxation based
upon its actual effect rather than its legal terminology." 6 8
a. Nexus and Discrimination
The nexus and discrimination provisions of the Complete Auto

test underscore the constitutional restrictions on state taxation. Considerations of due process and jurisdiction are obviously implicit in
the substantial nexus standard. There must be a "minimum contact"
or sufficient presence of the taxpayer in the taxing state so that it
has proper jurisdiction over the taxpayer. In addition, this require-

ment provides for an effective political check by ensuring that the
tax will have some adverse impact on in-state interests to whom the
state legislature is politically responsible.6 9 There is no doubt that

the activity of mineral severance, requiring as it does a large, local extractive industry, is sufficiently connected with the state to permit
state taxation. The thorny question is whether such taxes are dis-

criminatory. The mining industry can cite a host of cases for the
proposition that a discriminatory tax, which permits a state to take
advantage of its fortuitous position in the national economy at the
expense of others, is per se void. 7" Severance taxes are contrary to

the free trade purpose of the commerce clause in that they are placed
on commodities destined primarily for the interstate market and to
meet the energy needs of states not having their own energy resources. 7

The industry will argue that even if a tax is facially neu-

67. Id. at 279.
68. Id. at 281.
69. See National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue of the State of Illinois, 386 U.S.
753 (1967); American Oil Co. v. Neill, 380 U.S. 451 (1965).
70. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (holding that state cannot keep
minnows in-state while prohibiting out-of-state sales); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,
437 U.S. 617 (1978) (holding that state cannot isolate itself from other states' waste absent
bona fide health reasons); Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission, 429 U.S. 318
(1977) (striking down a discriminatory state tax on stock transfers); Pennsylvania v. West
Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) (holding that state cannot prefer in-state consumers over outof-state purchasers in sale of natural gas); and Altus v. Carr, 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex.
1966) (holding that state cannot prohibit out-of-state sales of groundwater).
71. In H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949), the Court strongly expressed the central free trade purpose of the commerce clause:
The material success that has come to inhabitants of the states which make up
this federal free trade unit has been one of the most impressive in the history
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tral, the disparate burden of the tax on citizens of other states makes
such taxes discriminatory in application.
The state can respond by emphasizing that the Supreme Court has
invalidated only those state taxes which have involved elements of
economic or environmental isolationism; taxes such as those levied
on out-of-state consumers coming into the state to trade, or on local
persons attempting to do business out-of-state rather than through
in-state markets. 7 2 The state will note that its severance tax applies
to all who extract the resource. No discrimination exists since all
companies pay the tax, irrespective of the state of incorporation, the
business location, or the ultimate destination of the resource. The
state can also argue that the "mere fact that the impact of the tax,
because of the export nature of the business, may be passed on to
out-of-state buyers of the ultimate7 product has never been held in
and of itself to be discriminatory." 3
b. Fair Apportionment and Relation to Benefits
These two requirements focus on the amount of the tax and its
constitutional fairness, rather than the power to tax. The apportionment provision is designed to prevent interstate commerce from paying total taxes substantially greater than local commerce. By requiring
that the amount of tax be relative to the amount of business activity
occurring in the taxing state, this provision ensures that the state
exacts only a fair demand for that aspect of interstate commerce to
which it bears a special relation. Because the apportionment rule was
intended to prevent multiple tax burdens, it is arguably not applicable to severance taxation: "The principle that every adjoining state
cannot tax oil passing through a pipeline at its full value just because
it 'passes through' has nothing to do with a severance tax. A comof commerce, but the established interdependence of the states only emphasizes the necessity of protecting interstate movement of goods against local
burdens and repressions.... May Michigan provide that automobiles cannot
be taken out of that State until local dealers' demands are fully met? Would
she not have every argument in the favor of such a statute that can be offered
in support of New York's limiting sales of mile for out-of-state shipment to
protect the economic interests of her competing dealers and local consumers?
Could Ohio then pounce upon the rubber-tire industry, on which she has a
substantial grip, to retaliate for Michigan's auto monopoly?
Id. at 538-39.
72. See cases cited at note 70 supra. See also Arizona Public Service Co. v. Snead, 441
U.S. 141 (1979); Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977);
Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 137 (1970).
73. C. DUMARS & L. BROWN, supra note 15, at 25. See, e.g., Heisler v. Thomas Colliery
Co., 260 U.S. 245 (1922); Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517 (1886).
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modity can only be mined once. Thus, the potential for multiple
mining taxation is logically impossible."''
Of much greater concern is the requirement that the tax be fairly
related to the services provided by the State. This provision lies at
the heart of the Complete Auto test; it is the ultimate constitutional
measuring rod which asks the decisive question: "[W] hether the
state has given anything for which it can ask return?" 7 Fortunately
for the states, the Supreme Court not only has broadened the scope
of state taxing powers, but it also has been generous in defining the
kinds of benefits and costs that will justify taxation. In a leading case,
the Court said that a state tax can contemplate both tangible services,
such as police and fire protection, and more amorphous benefits such
as the opportunities which it has given and the advantage it has conferred "by the fact of being an orderly, civilized society." 7 6 In Department of Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring
Cos.,7" the Court firmly stated that "The commerce clause balance
tips against the tax only when it unfairly burdens commerce by extracting more than a just share from the interstate activity." 7 In
effect, a state is required to show no more than that the tax is reasonable in relation to the benefits and opportunities provided. The Court
has turned an unsympathetic ear to the argument that an otherwise
reasonable tax may incidentally increase the cost to consumers in
other states. In Michelin Tire Corporation v. Wages," 9 in which the
Court upheld an ad valorem property tax on tires stored in a warehouse, the Court said that a state's nondiscriminatory taxes are the
"quid pro quo for benefits actually conferred by the taxing State.
There is no reason why local taxpayers should subsidize the services
used by the importer ....

0

The Court's reasoning in Michelin would seem to apply with equal
force to the question of state severance taxes. As a source of public
capital the severance tax can be passed directly to the energy consumer who bears the ultimate responsibility for and derives the ultimate benefit from the energy impact. To determine that consumers
should not bear this cost "would accord to large population centers
the luxury of demanding unlimited energy supplies regardless of the
74. C. DUMARS & L. BROWN, supra note 15, at 62.
75. Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940). "A state is free to pursue
its own fiscal policies, unembarrassed by the Constitution, if by the practical operation of a
tax the state has exerted its power in relation to the opportunities which it has given..." Id.
76. Id. See also Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948); Freeman v.
Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
77. 435 U.S. 734 (1978).
78. Id. at 748.
79. 423 U.S. 276 (1976).

80. Id. at 288-89.
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adverse effects of energy conversion upon far-distant states where the
conversion occurs."'8 In fact, the Supreme Court has gone so far as
to indicate that the relevant commerce clause standard can involve
more than the Complete Auto relation to benefits test. In Arizona
Public Service Co. v. Snead,8 2 the Court stated that a tax may also
be justified because it effects a legitimate public purpose; in that case
the environmental and other societal problems associated with coalpowered electrical generation. For the most part, the Court has been
sensitive to state environmental concerns. Its stated willingness now
to consider specific problems suggests that western states should not
hesitate to articulate explicit policy objectives for the public purposes underlying resource taxation.
The most obvious need for severance taxes is to compensate the
state for the special expenes incurred by state and local governments
on behalf of the extractive industry: the construction and repair of
special roads and other facilities that do not serve the general public;
a portion of the impact costs of growth associated with boom towns;
the cost of water use planning and extensive environmental monitoring, regulation and oversight; and finally, especially with uranium
mining, the expense of mine waste stabilization and neutralization.
The impact on state treasuries is heightened by the fact that much of
the energy development is occurring in sparsely settled, remote areas
with minimal physical and service infrastructure. Naturally, such
communities have wholly inadequate or totally non-existent revenue
bases. Severance taxes, because they can be easily adjusted as needs
require, are an excellent mechanism for meeting these kinds of immediate needs. 8
However, severance taxes should also contemplate longer-range
problems, both those inherent in the mining process and those peculiar to the western setting. The mainstay of western economies-agriculture, wilderness, and recreational activities-are being adversely
affected, perhaps permanently, and mining activity is occurring now
81. Van Baalen, Mineral Export Legislation-Canit Withstand Federal Preemption and
Commerce Clause Challenges?, 12 LAND & WATER L. REV. 131, 176 (1977).
82. 441 U.S. 141 (1979). The case involved a constitutional challenge to the New Mexico electrical energy tax levied on power transmissions out-of-state. Because Congress interceded with a law aimed at invalidating the tax, the Supreme Court's decision overturning the
tax was based on federal preemption rather than broader commerce clause principles. Nonetheless, the Court stated: "The generation of electricity in the Four Corners region undoubtedly also generates environmental and other problems for New Mexico. There is no indication that Congress intended to prevent the State from taxing the generation of electricity to
pay for solutions to these problems." Id. at 150-51.
83. Severance taxes have been described aptly as "... analogous to the fabled tax on
bachelors, where collections were earmarked for children born out of wedlock; the underlying tax policy was that the parties causing the problem should compensate society for
some of the damage." Whiteside & Gillig, supra note 7, at 598.
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in areas of high aesthetic quality. Severance taxes should encompass
both the ecological degradation and the loss of alternative future uses
for the mined lands. As one report notes, "Although these damages
may not be readily measured, the large amounts of time and resources expended by many environmentally oriented citizens in attempting to reduce or eliminate these aesthetic damages reveal their
significance." 8 4
In addition, there is that severance tax policy which stirs the greatest controversy but which western states are increasingly adamant in
asserting: the policy of asset replacement, or the notion that severance taxes represent a claim by the state to a part of the value of its
underground wealth lost by the mining. 8 Free trade proponents
bristle at this suggestion. The West, they claim, has no proprietary interest in its underground wealth and severance taxes represent nothing more than an unlawful booty on minerals that belong to the
nation as a whole. 8 6 Moreover, they argue that the West is obligated
to contribute appropriately in solving the national energy problem.
But the western states are looking beyond the immediate crisis to a
time when the mineral resources are ultimately depleted and the
nation shifts to a non-fossil fuel economy in the early 21st century.
Their economic planning is premised on the hard reality that each of
the resources on which the taxes are levied is finite and non-renewable. As the resources diminish, state and local governmental units
face the inevitable prospect of an eventual decline in the revenues
available to support public services. For this reason western states
caution that "energy development will find acceptance in the West
only as an instrument of orderly and high quality community development and not as a necessity of national policy."" 7 Their position
is not one of gaining economic advantage but of simply maintaining
parity with states having renewable resources.8 8 Severance taxes
should reflect the opportunity which is granted to mining concerns
to exhaust a state's non-renewable resources. Likewise, the rate of
taxation should be sufficient to establish a permanent fund that can
be used to develop alternative sources of dependable revenue similar
to that taken for granted in other states.
84. C. DUMARS & L. BROWN, supra note 15, at 83.
85. Id. at 83, 115-29.
86. FederalLimitations, supra note 13, at 971.
87. THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN INSTITUTE FOR POLICY RESEARCH, FINANCING
INFRASTRUCTURE IN WESTERN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT AREAS 2 (1975). "As a
source of public capital for energy impacted areas the severance tax has the advantage that it
is passed directly to the energy consumer who bears the ultimate responsibility for and derives the ultimate benefit from the impact..." Id. at 5.
88. C. DUMARS & L. BROWN, supra note 15, at 79.
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Is Heisler Still Alive?
The Supreme Court has not decided a resource taxation case since
the Heisler trilogy of the 1920s, and it remains to be seen whether
the Court would analyze modern day severance taxes under the Complete Auto relation-to-benefits test or the severance-precedes-commerce standard of Heisler. It is perhaps significant that the Supreme
Court has continued to cite the Heisler cases in recent decisions. In
196 1, when the Court upheld a state license tax on the local business
of commercial fishing, it cited with approval one of the Heisler cases:
Here, as there, the market for the product obtained locally is interstate, the taking being a step in the process leading to an interstate
market. In both the local product is promptly loaded for interstate
shipment. But in each there is a preliminary local business being conducted-an occupation made up of a series of local activities which
the State can constitutionally reach.8 9
The state of Montana views the Court's continuing citation of the
Heisler cases as a demonstration of their continuing validity. However, the mining companies challenging the Montana severance tax
point out that the Heisler rationale is completely irreconcilable with
modern tax cases. 9 0 They contend that the Heisler cases are cited for
a different purpose: to illustrate the type of local activity that will
provide a sufficient nexus to permit state taxation under modern
cases. They point out that the Heisler doctrine was formulated in an
all-or-nothing context. In each of the Heisler cases taxpayers were
seeking to avoid state taxes altogether. They did so by claiming that
their activities were in interstate commerce and thus totally immune
from state taxation. The Supreme Court rejected that contention in
each case, ruling that the taxed activity was local in nature and therefore properly subject to state taxation. The Court, however, did not
hold that such local taxation was necessarily immune from commerce
clause analysis. In fact, in subsequent decisions the Court made clear
that the commerce clause can invalidate state taxes on activities
which might have been local under earlier rules.
In Nippert v. Richmond9 1 the Court invalidated a tax on out-ofstate solicitors, observing that "there is no known limit to the human
mind's capacity to carve out from what is an entire or integral eco89. Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U.S. 199, 203-04 (1961). See also Dunbar-Stanly Studios,
Inc. v. Alabama, 393 U.S. 537 (1969), in which the Court again cited with approval one of
the Heisler cases: "The extraction of a natural resource within a State is not immunized
from state taxation merely because, once extracted, the product will immediately be
shipped out of the state for processing and sale to consumers." Id. at 541.
90. Briefs for Plaintiff and Defendant, Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, No.
42657 (1st. Jud. Dist. July 27, 1979).
91. 327 U.S. 416 (1946).

NATURAL RESOURCESJOURNAL

[Vol. 20

nomic process particular phases or incidents, label them as 'separate
and distinct' or 'local,' and thus achieve its desired result." '9 2 The
Court cautioned that finding a local incident was necessary but not
alone sufficient to sustain a tax. Courts must also examine "considerations of constitutional policy having reference to the substantial effects, actual or potential, of the particular tax in suppressing or
burdening unduly the commerce.

"'

In none of the Heisler cases was it argued that while states may
exact a resource tax, it is the particularly high rate of tax that discriminates against interstate commerce. Once the argument is framed
upon this distinction, the forcefulness of the Heisler trilogy appears
questionable. The modern decisions effectively undermine the Heisler
rationale in yet another way. The severance-proceeds-commerce rule
was believed to be necessary if numerous state taxes were to be protected from commerce clause attack. If local activities had been
deemed to be in commerce, state taxation would have been precluded according to the mechanical tests of the day. No longer is this
concern necessary. The modern balancing approach, enunciated in
Complete Auto, accomodates both state and federal interests. A state
may now tax even wholly interstate activities, provided only that its
taxes are non-discriminatory, fairly apportioned, based on some
nexus to the state, and are reasonably related to the services provided
by the state.
SUPREMACY CLAUSE LIMITATIONS
In challenging the Montana coal severance tax, the mining and utility companies have peppered their arguments with dire predictions
from economic experts. They estimate that over the next decade
alone the Montana tax will prevent the production of some 20 million tons of coal each year and will add approximately 72 million
dollars annually to national energy costs.9 ' Indeed, the companies
argue that the severance tax has already had an immediate and chilling impact: not a single new coal mine has opened in Montana since
the tax was enacted; existing mines are operating below capacity;
contracts have been cancelled; and new contracts for Montana coal
have dropped off dramatically. 9 In view of the country's critical
energy situation, the argument presents an intolerable situation. It
92. Id. at 423.
93. Id. at 423-24.
94. Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 35-37, Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, No. 42657 (1st Jud. Dist. July 27,
1979).
95. Id.
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also permits the companies to argue that the tax is void under the
supremacy clause of the Constitution.
The supremacy clause, Article VI, § 2 of the United States Constitution, preempts all state legislation which frustrates the full effectiveness or "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." 9 6 It can preclude
state regulation either because of a conflict with federal law or because it is determined that the federal legislation was meant to occupy
the field. The mining companies assert that the Montana tax substantially impairs national energy and clean air policies aimed at encouraging the use of low sulfur coal. These policies are clearly expressed
in the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975;9 the Power
Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978;' 8 the Clean Air Act;9
the Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974;1

0

and the Federal Nonnuclear Energy Research and Development Act
of 1974.10 1

In addition, the companies argue that the Montana tax directly
contravenes the entire statutory scheme established by the Mineral
Lands Leasing Act of 1920.1 02 That act culminated and settled a
long dispute between the federal government and western states over
the control and use of the public domain. The act reflects the decision that public coal lands would be held in trust, allowing the federal government to derive the economic rents from the mineral
through its coal leases. In turn the states were granted a share of all
federal royalties from the mineral leases within their borders, partially to offset the costs imposed by the coal mining.1 0 3 The mining
companies argue that the Montana tax grossly distorts this legislative
compromise since it appropriates directly to the state
a major part of
1
the economic rents attributable to coal extraction. 0 4
The states, however, can point to language in the Mineral Act itself
stating that the law shall not "be construed or held to affect the rights
96. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). See generally Note, Pre-emption as a
Preferential Ground: a New Canon of Constitution, 12 STAN. L. REV. 208 (1959).
97. 42 U.S.C. § § 6201-6422 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
98. Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 15, 42,
45, 49 U.S.C.).
99. 42 U.S.C. § § 7401-7642 (Supp. 11 1978).
100. 15 U.S.C. § § 791-798 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
101. 42 U.S.C. § § 5901-5920 (1976 & Supp. 111978).
102. Ch. 85, 41 Stat. 437 (1920) (current version at 30 U.S.C. § § 22-263 (1976 &
Supp. 11 1978).
103. The states originally received a 37/2 percent share of all federal royalties. In 1976,
this share was increased to fifty percent. Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1975,
Pub. L. No. 94-377, § 9(a) 90 Stat. 1089 (1976) (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 191 (1976)).
104. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 6, at 46.
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of the states or other local authority to exercise any rights... including the right to levy and collect taxes upon improvements, output of mines, or other rights . . ."' 0" The state can also argue that

the Court should not accord preemptive force to general congressional policies which express no clear intent to preempt state severance taxes. Indeed, in the recently passed Windfall Profits Tax, Con-

gress recognizes the right of states to exact severance taxes, albeit at
a restricted level.' 0 6 It should be noted that state resource taxation
is an area historically rooted in the sovereign power of the states. It
can be argued that if federal statutes are construed to prevent states
from raising the revenue necessary to support state government, this
would violate the principles of state sovereignty articulated in National League of Cities v. Usery. 1 0 ' That case struck down the extension of federal wage and hour laws to state and municipal em-

ployees, not because the regulated activity was beyond the scope of
the commerce power, but rather because the regulation substantially

interfered with the sovereign power reserved to the states by the
Tenth Amendment. The decision broadly states that the Tenth

Amendment may bar any federal action that impairs the state's integrity; forces relinquishment of important governmental activities;
interferes with traditional aspects of state sovereignty; or forces
directly upon the states ...(federal) choices as to how essential deci-

sions regarding the conduct of integral governmental functions are to
be made.'

0 8

The states' arguments might find a receptive bench in the Burger
Court. On the theory of cooperative federalism, the Court has been
reluctant to find federal preemption absent a clear and manifest con-

gressional intention to displace state regulation. 1 09 Nonetheless, the

105. 30 U.S.C. § 189 (1976).
106. Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 101(a) (§ 4996(c)), 94 Stat. 248 (1980) (to be codified as
26 U.S.C. § 4996(c)). The law permits a limited deduction for state severance taxes. In
states that impose a severance tax higher than 15 percent, the deduction is figured as though
the rate were 15 percent. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 817, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 104, reprinted
in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1240, 1255.
107. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
108. Id. at 843-55. The opinion in Usery may read too broadly. Justice Brennan dissented, saying that the decision attempted to repudiate the fundamental principle "that the
Constitution contemplates that restraints upon exercises by Congress of its plenary comcomerce power lie in the political process and not in the judicial process." Id. at 857. And
while Justice Blackmun concurred in the opinion, he emphasized that it should not be read
to "outlaw federal power in areas such as environmental protection, where the federal interest is demonstrably greater and where state facility compliance with imposed federal standards would be essential." Id. at 856.
109. See generally New York State Department of Social Services v. Duplino, 413 U.S.
405 (1973) (welfare is a regulatory field of great interest to both states and the federal government); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (no clear and unambiguous intent to

October 19801

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS

state severance tax could still be invalidated if the Court were to conclude that the tax substantially frustrates national energy policies.
With the prospect of a deepening energy crisis and increasing intergovernmental tensions, the supremacy clause should stand as a constant reminder to the states that they must act cautiously and with a
demonstrable concern for their position inthe federal system.
CONCLUSION AND FINAL CAVEATS
It is suggested that in large part the arguments on either side of the
severance tax question "take on added or diminished stature depending on the rate of the particular tax."' I0 The old severance-preceedscommerce approach of earlier cases was perhaps appropriate in an era
of nominal severance tax rates. But as these taxes now move into the
double-digit figures, mineral states must be prepared to show, both
factually and legally, that their taxes are fairly related to the benefits
and services provided by the state or the costs incurred.
States should be cautioned that if excessively high resource taxes
effectively preclude or hinder access to natural resources, the state
most certainly will face charges of trade barrierism or resource isolationism. These are precisely the sort of practices that the commerce
clause was intended to prevent, and recent cases indicate that when
faced with such cases, the Supreme Court dispenses with the Pike
balancing test and applies a virtual per se rule of invalidity.' ' ' Nowhere is this invalidating factor invoked more consistently than in
cases involving natural resources. As the Court has said, "We need
only consider the consequences if each of the few states that produce
copper, lead, high-grade iron ore, timber, cotton, oil or gas should
decree that industries located in that state shall have priority. What
fantastic rivalries and dislocations and reprisals would ensue if such
practices were begun!"' ' 2 At the same time, since severance taxes
have been justified as encouraging resource conservation, it should be
noted that the Court has specifically recognized conservation as a
legitimate state purpose, "similar to the States' interests in protecting
exclude states from the patents and copyright field); City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973) (local control of take-off hours conflict with provisions of
the Federal Aeronautics Act).
110. C. DUMARS & L. BROWN, supra note 15, at 66.
111. E.g. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979). State law forbidding transportation of natural minnows out of state for sale, subjected to strict scrutiny and held repugnant
to commerce clause because rather than a less intrusive means of conservation, "Oklahoma
has chosen to 'conserve' its minnows in the way that most overtly discriminates against interstate comtnerce." Id. at 338.
112. H.P. Hood& Sonsv. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 538-39 (1949).
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the health and safety of their citizens."' 1 3 The Court has generally
upheld non-discriminatory conservation measures and has said that
when conservation is involved, "the national interest and the interest
of producing states may well tend to coincide."1' 14
These cases again underscore the value of establishing articulate
state policy rationales to support resource taxation. States are reminded that the establishment of a tax is a rule-making procedure in
administrative law, a fact that has not escaped the attention of the
Supreme Court. The modern balancing tests take many factors into
consideration, not the least of which may be the reasonableness with
which a state acts. For example, in two recent cases the Supreme
Court upheld state statutes that were aimed at ameliorating complex
social problems but which resulted in obviously discriminatory impacts on interstate commerce.' 1 5 In both cases, the Court showed a
marked deference to the state legislature and remarked favorably on
the rational and coherent way in which the legislation had been developed. Both statutes had been enacted only after a relatively thorough process involving special studies and market surveys, legislative
hearings and, in one case, a special veto hearing before the governor.
This process obviously persuaded the Court that the states were acting upon legitimate concerns and not solely to advance their own
economic interests. The cases indicate that a well-reasoned legislative
process may be the state's best assurance of success against commerce clause challenge. Not only can such a process favorably impress the Court, but it is likely to result in a comprehensive factual
record which can then be used to establish each element of the modern balancing tests.
The development of a full and complete factual record is an essential tactic, but one that is perhaps not readily apparent to the states.
This is because severance taxpayers are precluded by federal statute
from bringing suit initially in federal court.' 16 The challenge must
be heard in the courts of the tax-imposing state, and there the judges
tend to be more sympathetic to the state's position. For this reason,
the easiest tactics available to the state are motions to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and motions
113. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979).
114. Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179, 188 (1950).
115. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (state statute requiring vertically integrated oil companies to divest themselves of their retail operations); Hughes
v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (state bounty to scrap processors for destruction of vehicles formally titled in Maryland; proof of ownership lower for in-state processors).
116. See 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
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for summary judgment. This is precisely what happened in the Montana coal severance tax case. The Montana District Court granted the
state's motion to dismiss and, consequently, a full factual record was
never developed. The omission could prove fatal to the state's case if
the United States Supreme Court agrees to hear the case. States
would be much more prudent to anticipate Supreme Court review
and bolster their defense with as comprehensive a factual record as
possible, in addition to being prepared to meet the legal standards of
the modem balancing tests.
FRANCES C. BASSETT

